Processes and Systems
Processes and Systems
246. There are a large number of issues with the CCSC processes and systems that the Panel has identified. The processes and systems relate to how calls are received by the CCSC, decisions made about appropriate actions, and then dispatch of police units in response.
Initial Handling of Calls by Telecom New Zealand Ltd
247. Telecom has requirements under the Telecommunication Service Obligation (TSO) Deed to:
- provide a free service for genuine "111" calls to Telecom residential customers; and
- meet certain service standards in delivering that service, such as: Telecom must answer 85% of "111" calls within 15 seconds.
248. Telecom answers approximately 200,000 calls per month of which 68% are false calls. After filtering by Telecom, up to 40,000 calls are put through to Police CCSC each month. The Telecom operators manually route these calls to the relevant Communications Centre.
249. The first issue in these statistics is the extremely high number of false or bogus "111" calls. Telecom has achieved some reductions in these calls by charging $6 for the second and subsequent non-genuine Telecom land-line call in a month. There are technological solutions that would assist in filtering these calls such as ‘natural language speech recognition’ but such utilisation requires funding and approval/support from emergency service providers and Government, which the Commissioner may wish to raise with Government. The Panel would not promote this as a priority course of action as Police has other priorities to deal with. However, such a course of action will assist with the effective handling of "111" calls in the future.
250. A second issue is the growing number of "111" calls that Telecom operators divert or ‘bounce’ between Centres. In November 2004, there were 1760 ‘bounced’ calls which is currently about 5% of all the calls Telecom presents to Police, although recently the number of bounced calls has increased to up to 3,000 a month.[13] This occurs when Telecom operators manually re-route calls to another Centre if the calls are not answered after 25 rings or 75 seconds. When the call is re-presented to another Centre, it goes to the bottom of the queue and does not receive priority. This process was introduced in 1996 as an interim measure.
251. The number of ‘bounced’ calls misrepresents Police statistics on call response (wait) times.
252. The Review Panel believes this situation can be readily solved by introducing automated queue technology (NACD) to present calls to the first available call taker in any one of the Communications Centres. This would improve call response times and optimise call taking resources.
253. Furthermore, operating on this basis would enable a national rostering model which in turn would ensure that all abstractions are managed across the three Centres.
254. However, as previously mentioned, each Centre needs to be developed to cope with the current demand and should ideally operate independently in the interim to ensure that each site has sufficient capability before any move is made towards a virtual model.
255. Other operational issues at the Telecom side of the process include calls presented and answered by Police with no speech from the Police communicator and calls held i.e. calls not released by Police when they are completed.
256. The ‘no-speech’ phenomenon, although accounting for only 30 - 60 calls a month, can significantly increase call response times as the Telecom operator has to liaise with Police and/or the Telecom Operation Centre to find the call and manually release it so it can be re-presented to another Centre. Despite a number of reviews to solve the problem, it persists.
257. The general causes for the ‘no-speech’ problem are a headset or cable problem, a shift changeover where the police operator logs out incorrectly or when auto-answer is activated by the operator but there is no operator there to answer the call. As the primary causes appear to be operator error, the Panel believes the problem should be readily solved through adherence to operational procedures, and training.
258. The call held issue is again apparently caused through Police call taker error and should be readily minimised and ideally eliminated, by training and effective performance management.???
Non-Urgent Calls
259. The CCSC operates a ‘dual gateway’ model wherein Communications Centres accept both emergency (111) calls as well as non-emergency calls from Police stations and *555 traffic calls. There are also call queues from the Ambulance Service and Rescue Coordination Centre (AES queue).
260. Non-emergency, non "111", calls represent around 65% of all calls coming into the CCSC.
261. The Panel strongly believes that there are definite operational advantages in all non-emergency calls to Police nationally, being channelled though a common 0800 number (SNEN) or similar.
Call Taking
262. Having observed call takers (communicators) in all the Centres, the Panel considers that the consistency of call quality needs to be significantly improved. The Panel accepts that many calls are answered appropriately, but has also observed call taking behaviours that frustrated and angered callers and delayed retrieval of essential information.
263. The Panel knows from experience that the call taking role is the most crucial in the response process. The time spent in training and coaching on the job to get call management effective and efficient is an essential investment.
264. The Panel observed behaviour such as poor questioning techniques, little rapport being established with the caller, little clarification to the caller of why the questions are being asked, long silences from call takers during data entry which leads to callers querying whether anyone is still on line with them, lack of consistency in what is being asked, expressed anger and frustration with the caller, and some arguments as a result.
265. The Panel strongly believes that initial and ongoing training for communicators needs to concentrate on call taking skills such as structured call taking, active listening, and call management and control. The better call quality becomes, the quicker communicators will get the information required to categorise the priority of the call, enabling more efficient dispatch.
Communication issues between Communicators and Dispatchers
266. The Panel also observed communication issues between communicators and dispatchers. These arose from dispatchers being frustrated with the lack of information on an incident provided by communicators. The Panel believes that these issues can be readily resolved through training, clarity around procedures, and supervision.
267. A move to dual role operators will help staff understand the priorities and difficulties associated with each role and ideally lead to more cooperative working arrangements.
268. The addition of dispatch assistants should be considered as an option for high volume periods. This role would alleviate dispatch pressures by completing computer checks and making any necessary telephone calls to enable a dispatcher to focus on managing the radio channel. Obviously, the deployment of such a role would need to consider the associated logistical and financial implications.
Caller Identification
269. The new Intergraph upgrade to version 7.9 of CARD will support Centre process improvements by enabling access to caller line identification (CLI) for unlisted Telecom customers. Police reports however that there are issues with data matching and this is being progressed with Telecom.
270. The inclusion of CLI data for customers of service providers other than Telecom will require commercial data sharing. Such a move will require long term negotiations, as it involves matters of commercial sensitivity, privacy issues and may require changes to legislation.
271. Similarly, the development of a Mobile Line Identification (MoBI) capability to identify the caller and location of a mobile or cellular telephone, should be investigated as a future long term opportunity
Dispatch
Channel Usage
272. Dispatch channel volumes vary considerably by area and time of day. The central city channels e.g. ‘Auckland Central’, are extremely busy and on some occasions, become unsafe because front line police cannot get on to the channel due to so much radio traffic.
274. The Panel is aware that New Zealand Police has far more channels available than it is currently using. The Panel believes therefore, that channel usage should be addressed ideally by the NCB type body recommended earlier in this report. While it is acknowledged there are some considerable costs associated with operating more channels, including staffing, at the very least Auckland should be allocated another channel during times of forecast high radio traffic.
275. The Panel appreciates that opening up more channels will require more dispatchers and potential operational command issues in the larger areas. However, these issues need resolution now before channel volumes become unmanageable and risk officer safety.
Availability of Units to Respond
276. There are often more units available to potentially respond, than are logged on for dispatch. Dispatchers are often requesting over the channel if there are any units who can respond because s/he has none available. This situation is potentially extremely serious and should be looked at as a related issue from this review. The role of dispatcher is just that: to dispatch, it is not to request.
277. A second issue is the potential changed behavious of a dispatcher when they work regularly with the same section. On occasions, dispatchers were observed to be overly familiar with unit staff when dispatching jobs, which could potentially affect their objectivity when they feel they have a loyalty to a particular group.
278. Both of these points are supervisory issues. Service standards, compliance and accountability on the part of District staff must be the responsibility of field supervisors. This issue is dealt with further in the Operations section of this report.
CCSC Use of Intelligence Nodes or ‘Dummy Units’
279. There is a practice of allocating non-urgent jobs to intelligence nodes, colloquially known as ‘dummy units’ in order to clear jobs on the CARD system where urgent dispatch is not appropriate. This practice allows Districts to follow up in their own time. There appears however, to be a lack of clarity and formalisation around this process which needs to be addressed.
280. The Panel believes this is another CCSC operational practice that needs to be clearly discussed with, accepted by and coordinated with Districts and ideally be included in the Service Level Agreements if the practice is to continue. Without this level of clarity and understanding, Districts may fail to follow-up because watch-house sergeants are unaware of the practice. This practice is not encouraged because of the risk of service delivery failure if not properly managed.
281. The Panel acknowledges this practice has already been identified by Police and work is planned to progress the issue.
Unit Technology
282. Dispatch effectiveness and efficiency would be significantly improved by employing Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) and mobile data within Police units. The Panel endorses New Zealand Police’s current consideration of these technologies although advises that the deployment should be included in mid term plans rather than immediate implementation.
Ease of Use with LES (Wanganui) and NIA
283. Dispatch efficiency is often impeded by the need for dispatchers to cut and paste data from LES (Law Enforcement System) between screens. The Panel understands that the upgraded NIA system will still require dispatchers to cut and paste across screens. Although ‘Checks Channels’ are utilised on the busier channels to do the checks for dispatchers, there remains the technical issue of better linking these applications with CARD.
Local Knowledge
284. A common complaint from public callers and front line police is the apparent lack of locational knowledge of call takers and dispatchers.? This issue can partly be addressed through training and familiarisation tours of the CCSC staff. But if Police is to eventually move as the Panel has recommended to a virtual call taking queue by using NACD, then call takers and dispatchers will increasingly have to rely upon the mapping tools at their disposal. The CCSC should have access to the latest aerial mapping technology.??
285. The Panel acknowledges the concerns of the rural community that a lack of local knowledge within the CCSC can affect response times to rural emergencies. The Panel believes that by incorporating district council rapid numbering system data for every rural house into its mapping programme, call takers and dispatchers will be better able to identify locations.
286. It is acknowledged that Police has forged some slow progress but the issue relies on the co-operation of and delivery from other agencies, as well as impacting all emergency service providers. An alternative would be to provide GPS coordinates for every rural property, although this would take longer and be more costly to collect. Both concepts have merit, but a requirement for Centre staff, or candidates thereof, to display proficiency at some level for familiarity with New Zealand geography would also assist in this area.
287. The implementation of AVL in rural Districts will enhance a dispatcher’s ability to guide a unit to a static point, provided this is used in concert with up-to-date mapping systems.
Intergraph CARD screen field
288. An apparently minor formatting issue with the ‘Address Search’ screen field can cause significant delays in confirming a caller’s location. If call takers omit to broaden the address search parameters then they will often fail to confirm a particular street in the caller’s location.
289. It may be possible to investigate the inclusion of a technical fix or pop-up reminder, but this type of minor error inducing programme feature should be overcome through training.?
Radio Discipline and Security
290. Panel members have been surprised by the lack of radio discipline in communications between dispatchers and field staff. Communication is often ‘long winded’ and conversational. Master Standard Operating Procedures (MSOPs) and training should address these issues.
291. There remains concern about the security of radio channels and the risk this poses to front line staff. However this issue requires rigorous study and assessment before action can be undertaken. The Panel understands that Police currently has this issue under consideration.
MSOP and Full Deck
292. CCSC staff have access to MSOPs and Full Deck. From submissions made, the Panel understands that CCSC MSOPs are incomplete in some instances or out of date. This should be addressed as a priority by the National Management Group once resourced.
Performance Management Framework
293. The current performance indicators reported are inadequate to evaluate the overall performance of the CCSC and therefore provide the CCSC management and Police Executive with an incomplete and possibly even skewed picture of performance.
294. A full suite of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) should be designed to enable managers to accurately monitor the performance of each Centre. KPIs should not be limited to call answering and handling times but should also include abandoned and ‘bounced’ calls.
295. More administrative items should also feature as part of the performance framework, including the records of critical incident handling, debriefings and consultation undertaken either internally or externally.
296. The amount of training time, coaching and volume and regularity of quality control checks should also be considered for the performance framework.
297. Standardised reporting structures need to be developed to support the performance framework.
298. Monthly management reviews, including the KPIs, should be conducted with each team leader, shift manager and Centre manager in the interim to monitor performance and ensure progress is being made to improve performance.
Recommendations
299. The consistency of communicator call management skills should be improved as a priority through initial and refresher training, and on the job supervision.
300. A structured call taking approach should be adopted and included in communicator training.
301. More radio channels need to be allocated to metropolitan areas to ease channel loadings particularly during critical incidents and periods of predicted high radio traffic.
302. Rural Rapid Numbering Systems or GPS coordinate data, should be investigated for inclusion in mapping resources.
303. CCSC MSOPs (Master Standard Operating Procedures) should be completed as soon as is practicable and updated on a regular basis.
304. In consultation with the Organisational Performance Group, a full suite of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) should be designed to enable managers to accurately monitor the performance of each Centre, shift manager and team leader.
Endnotes
[12] Global Human Capital Survey, 2003, Pricewaterhouse Coopers
[13] Source: Telecom New Zealand Ltd. 2004 Call Data.
[14] The RCT Radio Control Software allows the linking of up to four Radio Telephone Channels. Linked channels effectively become a single channel with extended coverage area. All transmissions on any one channel are re-transmitted on all the linked channels.