Resources/Current Capability (ex people)

Facilities and Equipment

Location

130. In 1996, New Zealand Police moved from 29 District-based control rooms Computer Aided Dispatch [CAD] system to a centralised Communications and Resource Deployment (CARD) system. Three Communications Centres were established nationwide at the three main centres, namely Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch.

131. The establishment of three Centres allows for effective business continuity planning and provides access to a large proportion of the population for the purpose of recruiting and retaining staff.

132. The operation of three centres to deploy resources nationwide and the advances in technology being employed i.e. mapping systems and aerial photography; mean there is no longer a requirement for decentralised local dispatch. Use of other technology based tools such as Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) and Mobile Data Terminals (MDT) will further enhance this model although there should feature more as future plans rather than immediate courses of action. District-based dispatch is discussed later on in this report.

133. The Panel believes AVL should be trialled in a rural area before any move towards national roll-out. Similarly, in the experience and opinion of the Panel members and given the more fundamental issues that have been identified and need to be addressed first, the use of mobile data solutions will not bring any immediate benefits and should be considered as a mid to long term objective.

Buildings

134. The Central and Southern Communications Centres are collocated with the main policing centre in Wellington and Christchurch respectively. The Northern Communications Centre in Auckland is housed in a separate building along with part of the IT Service Centre. Each Centre also accommodates New Zealand Fire Communications with varying relationships and levels of cooperation reported.

135. There is however, no growth strategy and the trend of increasing resources being assigned to vote: Police by Government may have future implications and require the re-housing of one or more of the current Centres to allow for either Centre or District growth.

Business Continuity

136. The National Manager must ensure sufficient effort goes into addressing business continuity and ensure adequate contingency plans are in place. Centre Managers must take responsibility for testing contingency plans in coordination with each other and make certain all staff are familiar with these plans and what action to take in the event of an emergency affecting their own Centre, or one of the other Centres.

137. Business continuity planning needs a full hazards approach in respect to contingency (i.e. staff, facility, natural events, pandemics, habitability etc.) and should encompass relevant risk management considerations including all aspects of service, staff, training and quality assurance.

Design

138. In the experience and opinion of the panel members, the layout of each Centre appears cramped and there is no indication of where areas of responsibility lie. A more suitable set up would require clear demarcation for team leaders and shift managers and ensure that they remain visible within each Centre.

139. Any redesign of the Centres should involve an ergonomics consultant, preferably one with experience in a call centre environment. Every effort should be made in reducing ambient noise for call takers and dispatchers which will aid concentration and reduce distractions. Headset design and the use of back screens at each workstation may assist but any move to change should be thoroughly consulted with and communicated to staff. Flexibility of design should also be a high consideration to allow the Centres to evolve in line with future demand.

140. Design is a risk management, occupational health and wellness and injury prevention issue that the CCSC must consider.

141. The design of each centre must ensure visible leadership and the need to instill command.

142. The provision of training/muster/breakout rooms was considered acceptable at the Southern Centre, however should be considered as part of any redesign of the Northern and Central Centres in the short to mid term. Discreet, private office space should be provided to allow staff to receive individual coaching, debriefs and give them the opportunity to conduct such meetings in confidence if necessary. However, offices should not be used for supervisors or managers to consistently retire to when they should be supporting and overseeing staff on the floor.

143. The lack of natural lighting and shuttered windows at the Northern Centre is not conducive to a positive atmosphere, both physically and in terms of moods and emotions of staff. Although a very minor issue in the scheme of things, changing the window coverings should be one of a range of solutions when determining any other redesign of the Centre.

144. Again, while not a major issue, one matter brought to the attention of the panel as being unsatisfactory for staff at the Northern Centre who smoke, was having no sheltered or undercover area to do so. Even though this is a morale issue for some staff, as a responsible employer and given the inherent fire risk, it is unlikely that Police would encourage the practice. However, in an effort to avoid staff dissatisfaction in the future and potentially eliminate unscheduled breaks, applicants should be made fully aware of the situation and acceptable practices prior to joining the Centre.

145. Some of the aforementioned are minor irritants but nonetheless significant to some members. These sorts of issues should be handled on a site by site basis in a process that includes a Workplace Wellness Committee involving management supervisors and staff. These and probably other issues will arise over time and should get a hearing and resolution based on their merit and available funding.

Computer Hardware

146. All hardware related to dispatch and call taking systems is replaced on a four year cycle, with the last upgrade completed in June 2004. Laptops provided for business continuity planning were replaced in March 2005. Other Enterprise terminals in the CCSC are due for upgrade by the end of July 2005 as part of the Computer Infrastructure Replacement (CIR) programme.

Radio Channels

147. The management of radio channels is a joint responsibility of CCSC and IT. If capacity exists and increased requirements or operational needs are recognised, then functionality must be provided by IT. Once operational activity or control is engaged, the channel assignments must be the responsibility of the CCSC on the basis of clearly understood and agreed practices.

148. Radio channels are not being exploited to support communications. The use of more channels will cause a need for redesign of the operational floor as more radio channels will require more dispatch posts.

149. A separate radio channel for Auckland airport should be in place to support a potential major incident.

Recommendations

150. The National Manager should continue to address business continuity and ensure adequate contingency plans are in place, managers and staff are familiar with them and plans are tested quarterly.

151. A risk assessment of the vulnerabilities of the Northern Communications Centre in a variety of scenarios should be undertaken and reviewed regularly.

152. Once the pilot AVL programme is completed and evaluated, AVL should also be trialled in a predominately rural District before being rolled out nationally.

153. A pilot programme for the use of MDTs should be initiated with the future aim of providing MDTs in all operational police vehicles nationally.

154. An ergonomics consultant should be engaged to review the layout and design of each Centre with the intention of providing optimal working conditions.

155. The smoking policy should be fully communicated to all current and potential staff and monitored to ensure compliance.

156. A Workplace Wellness Committee should operate to identify and deal with appropriate issues raised by staff.