Leadership and Management

102.  The people in leadership and management roles within CCSC possess diverse professional and operational policing experience. The Panel has been impressed with the commitment to their work, and the desire to improve the CCSC’s performance and credibility with police officers and the public.

103.  There are, however, a large number of factors adversely affecting leadership and management behaviours in the CCSC. These are:

• the number of key management staff including the National Manager in acting appointments;
• the number of vacancies at this level including within the National Management Group;
• an ongoing lack of effective change management since the inception of the current business model;
• a lack of clarity among staff and management about the CCSC mission, roles and performance targets, and how these relate to the Crime and Crash Reduction Strategy;
• lack of clarity of command;
• an operational focus on managing call volumes;
• the high staff to supervisor ratios;
• a lack of management training when people are appointed to management or supervisory roles; and
• no formal staff mentoring or coaching practices.

104. As a result, members of management are increasingly frustrated by their inability to solve the problems, given the operational demand pressures they face every day.

105. When looking to appoint managers to the CCSC, Police should be seeking applicants who can confidently engage their staff as influential leaders, problem solvers, change managers and team builders.

106. In the immediate future when determining the management structure, Police should consider two different leadership roles. One to undertake change and a longer term successor role to maintain the development of the CCSC after the initial changes are implemented.

107. Once a National Manager is appointed, the NCB will need to support this person as the CCSC is likely to remain in the public spotlight. One way to do this will be through the appointment of a mentor. It is not necessary for this role to be filled by a communications expert, but likely candidates should have strong leadership and change management experience, preferably from another government department or private organisation to provide an alternative perspective. The position will also be supported by ongoing peer review as indicated in the implementation section of this report.

108. The person appointed to the National Manager position will no doubt hold credibility but that individual will also have to withstand considerable police and public scrutiny and should be fully prepared to do so.

109. The high staff to supervisor ratios (12-16:1) impact on the level of supervision; and time and effort devoted to individual staff members.

Command versus Management

110. The CCSC management team is required to exercise operational command of critical incidents until local, on the ground command, can take control. The requirement for critical incident command has been reinforced recently in the Pursuits Policy wherein a senior sworn officer within the CCSC assumes control of any reported pursuit. In other less critical incidents, non-sworn dispatchers essentially exercise delegated command from the shift supervisor who is always a sworn police officer of Sergeant or Inspector rank.

111. The command requirement has been overlaid on the CCSC management structure so that shift supervisors are always commissioned officers. This means that senior, experienced and capable non-sworn staff, some of whom are former sworn officers, can never assume the shift supervisor or Centre manager roles. Incidences were also observed where inexperienced sworn members were required to make command decisions (as pursuit controller) while non-sworn experienced members were not permitted due to the current policy.

112. The Panel believes there are other alternatives to providing critical incident command than having commissioned officers in each Centre. These options include providing a national critical incident officer roster "24/7". The CI Officer could be located in any of the Centres and lessen the need for the current numbers of commissioned officers rostered in each Centre. Such an arrangement could then open up shift supervisor and Centre manager roles to non-sworn staff.

113. There is a 24/7 Duty Officer role staffed by a Superintendent from the Police National Headquarters, contactable by pager. No mention of this position was made as a command option throughout the time spent with staff. This is a command option that should be highlighted to staff and included in the protocols for escalating command decisions as incidents demand.

114. Supervisors and managers would benefit from receiving training in call centre management rather than sworn staff relying solely on policing experience.

115. A potential management structure illustrating the concept of separating command and management is attached at Appendix Six.

Internal Communications

116. As indicated elsewhere in this report, a number of concerns were raised by staff about communication, or lack of, between themselves and the management. This is an issue which should be easily solved and once resolved will have a positive impact on the morale of staff by helping to ensure that they feel valued.

117. An agreed internal communications strategy should be developed in consultation with staff and include performance targets.

118. Staff focus groups should be established as part of the internal communications strategy so? staff can be canvassed on certain issues and feel they have a voice to raise issues without prejudice.

119. Focus groups could also be supported by an intranet site to facilitate a link between the three Centres and to make the information available to the rest of the organisation.

120. In the months following the Review, police across the country are likely to be interested in the ongoing outcomes and progress being made to address communications issues. News about the CCSC, recognising good work and providing progress reports, could be included in the Police Ten-One publication as a vehicle for accurate and informed messaging.

Recommendations

121. The NCB should act quickly to take initial management control of the CCSC and then:

• once the communications strategy is agreed, confirm the CCSC organisational structure and positions;
• appoint permanent, qualified staff to these positions; and
• provide initial management direction and then ongoing support to the National Manager, the NMG, and Centre Managers.

122. The NCB should then task the National Manager and the NMG, with preparing a revised business plan which reviews the CCSC vision, mission and objectives in light of the communications strategy.

123. The NCB should appoint a mentor to the National Manager, ideally from outside of New Zealand Police.

124. The NCB should consider appointing a change manager to assist the National Manager with the implementation of initial changes.

125. The CCSC management should receive training in managing communications centres. This will be an ongoing exercise and should also include other ranks within the CCSC to develop a level of expertise from the bottom up and across the levels of supervision and management.

126. The NCB should investigate the utility of splitting the critical incident command roles from the Communications Centre management roles.

127. Consideration should be given to reducing the high staff to supervisor ratios (12-16:1).

128. An agreed internal communications strategy, including staff focus groups, should be developed in consultation with staff and include performance targets.

129. Consideration should be given to creating a dedicated Communications column in the Police Ten-One publication.